Discussion Response 1

1. In Avant-Garde and Kitsch, Greenberg outlines the idea that "real art" occupies a precarious position: "real art" was oppressed in authoritarian regimes, but in the US it relied on wealth. Artists had to fund their art, and without funding, they would not be able to exercise the artistic freedoms provided to them by the US government. Greenberg called this an "umbilical cord of gold."

How does this reliance on funding sit with you? Is it right that artists should be reliant on the commercial success of their work, or should there be some other way to support art/design/culture that is truly challenging and maybe even disliked? How might an ideal society support Avant-Garde art, design, or ideas?

Your response should be approximately 200 words

2.In Modernist Painting, Greenberg identifies a few aspects of painters that he believes are unique to painting. On page 4 of the PDF, he says

"It was in the name of the purely and literally optical, not in the name of color, that the Impressionists set themselves to undermining shading and modeling and everything else in painting that seemed to connote the sculptural."

Shading and modeling, to Greenberg, were things that belonged to sculpture and thus were eliminated from painting on the way toward "purity". He goes on to list flatness, the "enclosing shape or frame" (i.e. the shape of the support of the canvas), and the idea of paint texture are things that belong to a "pure" painting.

If flatness, the shape of the canvas' support, and paint texture are characteristics of a "pure" painting, what are characteristics of a "pure" monument or a "pure" memorial? List two, and explain why you believe them to be essential to a monument or memorial.

Your response should be approximately 200 words.

CLEMENT GREENBERG

Modernist Painting

Forum Lectures (Washington, D. C.: Voice of America), 1960

Arts Yearbook 4, 1961 (unrevised)

Art and Literature, Spring 1965 (slightly revised)

The New Art: A Critical Anthology, ed. Gregory Battcock, 1966

Peinture-cahiers théoriques, no. 8-9, I974 (titled "La peinture moderniste")

Esthetics Contemporary, ed. Richard Kostelanetz, 1978

Modern Art and Modernism: A Critical Anthology. ed. Francis Frascina and Charles Harrison, 1982.

Greenberg's first essay on modernism, clarifying many of the ideas

implicit in "Avant-Garde and Kitsch", his groundbreaking essay written

two decades earlier. Although he later came to reject it, in its second

parapgraph he offers what may be the most elegant definition modernism

extant:

… the use of characteristic methods of a discipline to

criticize the discipline itself, not in order to subvert it but in

order to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence.

The essay is notable for its illuminating (and largely undeveloped)

observations about the nature and history of pictures, let alone Greenberg's

mid-life perception of the character and importance of the avant-garde. If

the theory has a weakness, it lies with the centrality of pictorial art, which

it seems to fit modernism like a glove. How much it extended to other art

media, let alone other disciplines, is debatable. Greenberg's 1978 post-

script remains relevant.

— TF

Modernism includes more than art and literature. By now it covers almost the whole of

what is truly alive in our culture. It happens, however, to be very much of a historical

novelty. Western civilization is not the first civilization to turn around and question its

own foundations, but it is the one that has gone furthest in doing so. I identify Modernism

with the intensification, almost the exacerbation, of this self-critical tendency that began

with the philosopher Kant. Because he was the first to criticize the means itself of

criticism, I conceive of Kant as, the first real Modernist.

The essence of Modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of characteristic methods of a

discipline to criticize the discipline itself, not in order to subvert it but in order to

entrench it more firmly in its area of competence. Kant used logic to establish the limits

of logic, and while he withdrew much from its old jurisdiction, logic was left all the more

secure in what there remained to it.

The self-criticism of Modernism grows out of, but is not the same thing as, the criticism

of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment criticized from the outside, the way criticism in

its accepted sense does; Modernism criticizes from the inside, through the procedures

themselves of that which is being criticized. It seems natural that this new kind of

criticism should have appeared first in philosophy, which is critical by definition, but as

the 18th century wore on, it entered many other fields. A more rational justification had

begun to be demanded of every formal social activity, and Kantian self-criticism, which

had arisen in philosophy in answer to this demand in the first place, was called on

eventually to meet and interpret it in areas that lay far from philosophy.

We know what has happened to an activity like religion, which could not avail itself of

Kantian, immanent, criticism in order to justify itself. At first glance the arts might seem

to have been in a situation like religion's. Having been denied by the Enlightenment all

tasks they could take seriously, they looked as though they were going to be assimilated

to entertainment pure and simple, and entertainment itself looked as though it were going

to be assimilated, like religion, to therapy. The arts could save themselves from this

leveling down only by demonstrating that the kind of experience they provided was

valuable in its own right and not to be obtained from any other kind of activity.

Each art, it turned out, had to perform this demonstration on its own account. What had to

be exhibited was not only that which was unique and irreducible in art in general, but also

that which was unique and irreducible in each particular art. Each art had to determine,

through its own operations and works, the effects exclusive to itself. By doing so it

would, to be sure, narrow its area of competence, but at the same time it would make its

possession of that area all the more certain.

It quickly emerged that the unique and proper area of competence of each art coincided

with all that was unique in the nature of its medium. The task of self-criticism became to

eliminate from the specific effects of each art any and every effect that might conceivably

be borrowed from or by the medium of any other art. Thus would each art be rendered

"pure," and in its "purity" find the guarantee of its standards of quality as well as of its

independence. "Purity" meant self-definition, and the enterprise of self-criticism in the

arts became one of self-definition with a vengeance.

Realistic, naturalistic art had dissembled the medium, using art to conceal art; Modernism

used art to call attention to art. The limitations that constitute the medium of painting —

the flat surface, the shape of the support, the properties of the pigment — were treated by

the Old Masters as negative factors that could be acknowledged only implicitly or

indirectly. Under Modernism these same limitations came to be regarded as positive

factors, and were acknowledged openly. Manet's became the first Modernist pictures by

virtue of the frankness with which they declared the flat surfaces on which they were

painted. The Impressionists, in Manet's wake, abjured underpainting and glazes, to leave

the eye under no doubt as to the fact that the colors they used were made of paint that

came from tubes or pots. Cézanne sacrificed verisimilitude, or correctness, in order to fit

his drawing and design more explicitly to the rectangular shape of the canvas.

It was the stressing of the ineluctable flatness of the surface that remained, however,

more fundamental than anything else to the processes by which pictorial art criticized and

defined itself under Modernism. For flatness alone was unique and exclusive to pictorial

art. The enclosing shape of the picture was a limiting condition, or norm, that was shared

with the art of the theater; color was a norm and a means shared not only with the theater,

but also with sculpture. Because flatness was the only condition painting shared with no

other art, Modernist painting oriented itself to flatness as it did to nothing else.

The Old Masters had sensed that it was necessary to preserve what is called the integrity

of the picture plane: that is, to signify the enduring presence of flatness underneath and

above the most vivid illusion of three-dimensional space. The apparent contradiction

involved was essential to the success of their art, as it is indeed to the success of all

pictorial art. The Modernists have neither avoided nor resolved this contradiction; rather,

they have reversed its terms. One is made aware of the flatness of their pictures before,

instead of after, being made aware of what the flatness contains. Whereas one tends to

see what is in an Old Master before one sees the picture itself, one sees a Modernist

picture as a picture first. This is, of course, the best way of seeing any kind of picture,

Old Master or Modernist, but Modernism imposes it as the only and necessary way, and

Modernism's success in doing so is a success of self-criticism.

Modernist painting in its latest phase has not abandoned the representation of

recognizable objects in principle. What it has abandoned in principle is the representation

of the kind of space that recognizable objects can inhabit. Abstractness, or the non-

figurative, has in itself still not proved to be an altogether necessary moment in the self-

criticism of pictorial art, even though artists as eminent as Kandinsky and Mondrian have

thought so. As such, representation, or illustration, does not attain the uniqueness of

pictorial art; what does do so is the associations of things represented. All recognizable

entities (including pictures themselves) exist in three-dimensional space, and the barest

suggestion of a recognizable entity sufffices to call up associations of that kind of space.

The fragmentary silhouette of a human figure, or of a teacup, will do so, and by doing so

alienate pictorial space from the literal two-dimensionality which is the guarantee of

painting's independence as an art. For, as has already been said, three-dimensionality is

the province of sculpture. To achieve autonomy, painting has had above all to divest itself

of everything it might share with sculpture, and it is in its effort to do this, and not so

much — I repeat — to exclude the representational or literary, that painting has made itself

abstract.

At the same time, however, Modernist painting shows, precisely by its resistance to the

sculptural, how firmly attached it remains to tradition beneath and beyond all

appearances to the contrary. For the resistance to the sculptural dates far back before the

advent of Modernism. Western painting, in so far as it is naturalistic, owes a great debt to

sculpture, which taught it in the beginning how to shade and model for the illusion of

relief, and even how to dispose that illusion in a complementary illusion of deep space.

Yet some of the greatest feats of Western painting are due to the effort it has made over

the last four centuries to rid itself of the sculptural. Starting in Venice in the 16th century

and continuing in Spain, Belgium, and Holland in the 17th, that effort was carried on at

first in the name of color. When David, in the 18th century, tried to revive sculptural

painting, it was, in part, to save pictorial art from the decorative flattening-out that the

emphasis on color seemed to induce. Yet the strength of David's own best pictures, which

are predominantly his informal ones, lies as much in their color as in anything else. And

Ingres, his faithful pupil, though he subordinated color far more consistently than did

David, executed portraits that were among the flattest, least sculptural paintings done in

the West by a sophisticated artist since the I4th century. Thus, by the middle of the 19th

century, all ambitious tendencies in painting had converged amid their differences, in an

anti-sculptural direction.

Modernism, as well as continuing this direction, has made it more conscious of itself.

With Manet and the Impressionists the question stopped being defined as one of color

versus drawing, and became one of purely optical experience against optical experience

as revised or modified by tactile associations. It was in the name of the purely and

literally optical, not in the name of color, that the Impressionists set themselves to

undermining shading and modeling and everything else in painting that seemed to

connote the sculptural. It was, once again, in the name of the sculptural, with its shading

and modeling, that Cézanne, and the Cubists after him, reacted against Impressionism, as

David had reacted against Fragonard. But once more, just as David's and Ingres' reaction

had culminated, paradoxically, in a kind of painting even less sculptural than before, so

the Cubist counter-revolution eventuated in a kind of painting flatter than anything in

Western art since before Giotto and Cimabue — so flat indeed that it could hardly contain

recognizable images.

In the meantime the other cardinal norms of the art of painting had begun, with the onset

of Modernism, to undergo a revision that was equally thorough if not as spectacular. It

would take me more time than is at my disposal to show how the norm of the picture's

enclosing shape, or frame, was loosened, then tightened, then loosened once again, and

isolated, and then tightened once more, by successive generations of Modernist painters.

Or how the norms of finish and paint texture, and of value and color contrast, were

revised and rerevised. New risks have been taken with all these norms, not only in the

interests of expression but also in order to exhibit them more clearly as norms. By being

exhibited, they are tested for their indispensability. That testing is by no means finished,

and the fact that it becomes deeper as it proceeds accounts for the radical simplifications

that are also to be seen in the very latest abstract painting, as well as for the radical

complications that are also seen in it.

Neither extreme is a matter of caprice or arbitrariness. On the contrary, the more closely

the norms of a discipline become defined, the less freedom they are apt to permit in many

directions. The essential norms or conventions of painting are a the same time the

limiting conditions with which a picture must comply in order to be experienced as a

picture. Modernism has found that these limits can be pushed back indefinitely — before a

picture stops being a picture and turns into an arbitrary object; but it has also found that

the further back these limits are pushed the more explicitly they have to be observed and

indicated. The crisscrossing black lines and colored rectangles of a Mondrian painting

seem hardly enough to make a picture out of, yet they impose the picture's framing shape

as a regulating norm with a new force and completeness by echoing that shape so closely.

Far from incurring the danger of arbitrariness, Mondrian's art proves, as time passes,

almost too disciplined, almost too tradition- and convention-bound in certain respects;

once we have gotten used to its utter abstractness, we realize that it is more conservative

in its color, for instance, as well as in its subservience to the frame, than the last paintings

of Monet.

It is understood, I hope, that in plotting out the rationale of Modernist painting I have had

to simplify and exaggerate. The flatness towards which Modernist painting orients itself

can never be an absolute flatness. The heightened sensitivity of the picture plane may no

longer permit sculptural illusion, or trompe-l'oeil, but it does and must permit optical

illusion. The first mark made on a canvas destroys its literal and utter flatness, and the

result of the marks made on it by an artist like Mondrian is still a kind of illusion that

suggests a kind of third dimension. Only now it is a strictly pictorial, strictly optical third

dimension. The Old Masters created an illusion i of space in depth that one could imagine

oneself walking into, but the analogous illusion created by the Modernist painter can only

be seen into; can be traveled through, literally or figuratively, only with the eye.

The latest abstract painting tries to fulfill the Impressionist insistence on the optical as the

only sense that a completely and quintessentially pictorial art can invoke. Realizing this,

one begins also to realize that the Impressionists, or at least the Neo-Impressionists, were

not altogether misguided when they flirted with science. Kantian self-criticism, as it now

turns out, has found its fullest expression in science rather than in philosophy, and when

it began to be applied in art, the latter was brought closer in real spirit to scientific

method than ever before — closer than it had been by Alberti, Uccello, Piero della

Francesca, or Leonardo in the Renaissance. That visual art should confine itself

exclusively to what is given in visual experience, and make no reference to anything

given in any other order of experience, is a notion whose only justification lies in

scientific consistency.

Scientific method alone asks, or might ask, that a situation be resolved in exactly the

same terms as that in which it is presented. But this kind of consistency promises nothing

in the way of aesthetic quality, and the fact that the best art of the last seventy or eighty

years approaches closer and closer to such consistency does not show the contrary. From

the point of view of art in itself, its convergence with science happens to be a mere

accident, and neither art nor science really gives or assures the other of anything more

than it ever did. What their convergence does show, however, is the profound degree to

which Modernist art belongs to the same specific cultural tendency as modern science,

and this is of the highest significance as a historical fact.

It should also be understood that self-criticism in Modernist art has never been carried on

in any but a spontaneous and largely subliminal way. As I have already indicated, it has

been altogether a question of practice, immanent to practice, and never a topic of theory.

Much is heard about programs in connection with Modernist art, but there has actually

been far less of the programmatic in Modernist than in Renaissance or Academic

painting. With a few exceptions like Mondrian, the masters of Modernism have had no

more fixed ideas about art than Corot did. Certain inclinations, certain affirmations and

emphases, and certain refusals and abstinences as well, seem to become necessary simply

because the way to stronger, more expressive art lies through them. The immediate aims

of the Modernists were, and remain, personal before anything else, and the truth and

success of their works remain personal before anything else. And it has taken the

accumulation, over decades, of a good deal of personal painting to reveal the general self-

critical tendency of Modernist painting. No artist was, or yet is, aware of it, nor could any

artist ever work freely in awareness of it. To this extent — and it is a great extent — art

gets carried on under Modernism in much the same way as before.

And I cannot insist enough that Modernism has never meant, and does not mean now,

anything like a break with the past. It may mean a devolution, an unraveling, of tradition,

but it also means its further evolution. Modernist art continues the past without gap or

break, and wherever it may end up it will never cease being intelligible in terms of the

past. The making of pictures has been controlled, since it first began, by all the norms I

have mentioned. The Paleolithic painter or engraver could disregard the norm of the

frame and treat the surface in a literally sculptural way only because he made images

rather than pictures, and worked on a support — a rock wall, a bone, a horn, or a stone —

whose limits and surface were arbitrarily given by nature. But the making of pictures

means, among other things, the deliberate creating or choosing of a flat surface, and the

deliberate circumscribing and limiting of it. This deliberateness is precisely what

Modernist painting harps on: the fact, that is, that the limiting conditions of art are

altogether human conditions.

But I want to repeat that Modernist art does not offer theoretical demonstrations. It can be

said, rather, that it happens to convert theoretical possibilities into empirical ones, in

doing which it tests many theories about art for their relevance to the actual practice and

actual experience of art. In this respect alone can Modernism be considered subversive.

Certain factors we used to think essential to the making and experiencing of art are

shown not to be so by the fact that Modernist painting has been able to dispense with

them and yet continue to offer the experience of art in all its essentials. The further fact

that this demonstration has left most of our old value judgments intact only makes it the

more conclusive. Modernism may have had something to do with the revival of the

reputations of Uccello, Piero della Francesca, El Greco, Georges de la Tour, and even

Vermeer; and Modernism certainly confirmed, if it did not start, the revival of Giotto's

reputation; but it has not lowered thereby the standing of Leonardo, Raphael, Titian,

Rubens, Rembrandt, or Watteau. What Modernism has shown is that, though the past did

appreciate these masters justly, it often gave wrong or irrelevant reasons for doing so.

In some ways this situation is hardly changed today. Art criticism and art history lag

behind Modernism as they lagged behind pre-Modernist art. Most of the things that get

written about Modernist art still belong to journalism rather than to criticism or art

history. It belongs to journalism — and to the millennial complex from which so many

journalists and journalist intellectuals suffer in our day — that each new phase of

Modernist art should be hailed as the start of a whole new epoch in art, marking a

decisive break with all the customs and conventions of the past. Each time, a kind of art

is expected so unlike all previous kinds of art, and so free from norms of practice or taste,

that everybody, regardless of how informed or uninformed he happens to be, can have his

say about it. And each time, this expectation has been disappointed, as the phase of

Modernist art in question finally takes its place in the intelligible continuity of taste and

tradition.

Nothing could be further from the authentic art of our time than the idea of a rupture of

continuity. Art is — among other things — continuity, and unthinkable without it. Lacking

the past of art, and the need and compulsion to maintain its standards of excellence,

Modernist art would lack both substance and justification.

Postscript (1978)

The above appeared first in 1960 as a pamphlet in a series published by the Voice of

America. It had been broadcast over that agency's radio in the spring of the same year.

With some minor verbal changes it was reprinted in the spring 1965 number of Art and

Literature in Paris, and then in Gregory Battcock's anthology The New Art (1966).

I want to take this chance to correct an error, one of interpretation and not of fact. Many

readers, though by no means all, seem to have taken the 'rationale' of Modernist art

outlined here as representing a position adopted by the writer himself that is, that what he

describes he also advocates. This may be a fault of the writing or the rhetoric.

Nevertheless, a close reading of what he writes will find nothing at all to indicate that he

subscribes to, believes in, the things that he adumbrates. (The quotation marks around

pure and purity should have been enough to show that.) The writer is trying to account in

part for how most of the very best art of the last hundred-odd years came about, but he's

not implying that that's how it had to come about, much less that that's how the best art

still has to come about. 'Pure' art was a useful illusion, but this doesn't make it any the

less an illusion. Nor does the possibility of its continuing usefulness make it any the less

an illusion.

There have been some further constructions of what I wrote that go over into

preposterousness: That I regard flatness and the inclosing of flatness not just as the

limiting conditions of pictorial art, but as criteria of aesthetic quality in pictorial art; that

the further a work advances the self-definition of an art, the better that work is bound to

be. The philosopher or art historian who can envision me — or anyone at all — arriving at

aesthetic judgments in this way reads shockingly more into himself or herself than into

my article.